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ABSTRACT
Nuclear power plants are some of the most sophisticated
and complex energy systems ever designed. These systems
perform safety critical functions and must conform to na-
tional safety institutions and international regulations. In
many cases, regulatory documents provide very high level
and ambiguous requirements that leave a large margin for
interpretation. As the French nuclear industry is now seek-
ing to spread its activities outside France, it is but necessary
to master the ins and the outs of the variability between
countries safety culture and regulations. This sets both an
industrial and a scientific challenge to introduce and propose
a product line engineering approach to an unaware industry
whose safety culture is made of interpretations, specificities,
and exceptions.
This paper presents our current work within the French
R&D project CONNEXION, while introducing variability
modeling to the French nuclear industry. In particular, we
discuss the background, the quest for the best variability
paradigm, the practical modeling of requirements variability
as well as the mapping between variable requirements and
variable architecture elements.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
J.7 [Computer Applications]: Computer in other Sys-
tems; D.2.1 [Software Engineering]: Requirements
General Terms
Legal Aspects, Experimentation
Keywords
requirements variability modeling, regulations, product line
engineering, variability mining
1. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear power plants are some of the most sophisticated
and complex energy systems ever designed. Nuclear safety
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covers the actions taken to prevent nuclear and radiation
accidents or to limit their consequences. This covers nu-
clear power plants and, more particularly, their instrumen-
tation and control systems (I&C), which have been using
more and more digital devices since the middle of the 1980’s.
Countries utilizing nuclear power have special institutions
overseeing and regulating nuclear safety. Nuclear industry
projects must comply with regulatory safety requirements
and recommendations that are expressed in large and het-
erogeneous documents: legal texts, international standards
or even regulatory specific positions.
Due to the lack of international consensus on regulatory
practices [17], the willingness to build such systems in dif-
ferent countries requires to face practices of several safety
authorities and can challenge the initial system design [13].
Therefore, it is necessary for our industrial partners to find
similarities in regulations in order to minimize the basic de-
sign efforts and its qualification. The French nuclear indus-
try and academic partners have joined forces in the CON-
NEXION project to develop the major innovations in the de-
sign and implementation of the future nuclear power plants’
I&C systems. One aspect of the project consists in the for-
malization, from a general and high level perspective, of both
requirements and architecture elements variabilities.
Introducing a software product line engineering approach
in this domain, which has a long history of exceptions and
individualities, sets both scientific and industrial challenges.
(Q1) How to introduce variability modeling to nuclear engi-
neers? (Q2) What is the best variability modeling paradigm,
accordingly to the domain practices? (Q3) How to deal with
the search space in regulatory corpora and what is the right
granularity level for modeling variability in requirements?
(Q4) How to bind a requirements variability model and an
architecture variability model in order to derive an architec-
ture that conforms to a requirements configuration?
In this paper, we address in particular the retrieval of a
variability model from regulatory requirements and its map-
ping to an architecture developed by a Nuclear consortium.
The contribution of the papers are: 1. an approach to model
variability in regulatory requirements, capture architectural
variability and investigate the robustness of the architecture
against requirements variability; 2. an illustration of the ap-
proach and tooling support on a realistic use case we have
conducted with industrial partners; 3. lessons learned about
the introduction of variability in this particular domain as
well as upcoming challenges.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we introduce a quick picture of the current nu-
clear regulatory requirements landscape and discuss the lack
of variability awareness of the nuclear industry. Section 3
presents research background. Section 4 gives an overview
of the proposed approach. Sections 5 and 6 describe the
overall variability approach. Section 7 describes the different
techniques used to implement our method and their applica-
tions in the context of the CONNEXION project. Section 8
presents related work while Section 9 concludes the paper
and describes future work.
2. INDUSTRIAL BACKGROUND
In this section, we introduce the context of our research
work (the CONNEXION project) as well as industrial and
academic challenges.
2.1 The CONNEXION Project
Since 2011, the CONNEXION1 project is a national work
program to prepare the design and implementation of the
next generation of I&C systems for nuclear power plants,
with an international compliance dimension. The CON-
NEXION project is built around a set of academic part-
ners (CEA, INRIA, CNRS / CRAN, ENS Cachan, LIG,
Telecom ParisTech) and on collaborations between large in-
tegrators such as AREVA and ALSTOM, EDF and ”tech-
nology providers” of embedded software (Atos Worldgrid,
Rolls-Royce Civil Nuclear, Corys TESS, Esterel Technolo-
gies, All4Tec, Predict).
For the specific concern of having a high level and global
perspective on requirements and architecture variability mod-
eling, the working group started on November 2013 and was
constituted of CEA, Inria, AREVA, EDF, Atos Worldgrid,
Rolls-Royce Civil Nuclear, and All4Tec engineers and re-
searchers. The group size varies from 3 to 14 persons de-
pending of the individual or collective task to perform. In
the group, Inria and All4Tec are considered as variability
experts while the rest of the participants have neither aca-
demic nor industrial variability culture. Between November
2013 and April 2014, the group has organized a dozen of
half-day to full day workshops as well as several regular or
ad hoc telephone meetings, which ensures a high level of
interactivity.
2.2 On the Regulation Heterogeneity and Vari-
ability
Safety critical systems must comply with their require-
ments, where regulatory requirements are first class citizens.
These requirements are from various natures, from regu-
lations expressed by national and international bodies, to
national explicit or implicit guidance or national practices.
They also come from national and international standards
when they are imposed by a specific regulator [19].
In the specific context of nuclear energy, one applicant has
to deal with very heterogeneous regulations and practices,
varying from one country to another. This heterogeneity has
a huge impact in the certification process as the regulators
safety expectations, evidences and justification to provide
can vary [18, 7].
At this level, the main concern comes from the difference
between national practices and the set of documents (reg-
ulatory texts ans standards) to comply with. The nuclear
1http://www.cluster-connexion.fr/
industry has an unstable and growing set of safety stan-
dards. Worse, the set of safety standards is increasing within
two main standards areas. On the one hand, there are the
IEEE/ISO standards that are mainly applied in the US and
eastern Asia. On the other hand, the IAEA/IEC standards
and recommendations followed in Europe2. This heterogene-
ity and lack of harmonization of the different nuclear safety
practices has been highlighted by the Western Europe Nu-
clear Regulators Association (WENRA)in 2006 [17].
Proposing one system, when having to perform a safety
function, in different countries then leads to a huge problem
of variability that concerns, not only the set of requirements
to comply with and the certification process, but also the
system’s architecture itself.
2.3 Lack of Product Line Culture
Rise and Fall of the EPR reactor out of France.
In France, EDF owns and operates 58 nuclear power units,
following four different designs or series (same design but
specific projects). Born from a European program, the Evo-
lutionary Pressurized Reactor (EPR) design represents the
new power plant generation and has been expected to be
built on several countries: France, Finland, the United-
Kingdom, China, and later, in the USA. The British safety
authorities reference the same set of IEC standards as in
France. However, their acceptable practices differ on some
significant points. US authorities provide detailed written
regulatory requirements and guidance but endorse but IEEE
documents.
As a consequence, the concept of series that enabled to
design and maintain the nuclear power plants in France can
no longer be applied as such for export. Thus, since 2008,
in the five most advanced EPR projects (construction in
Finland, France and China, certification in progress in the
USA and UK), EDF and Areva have been with four different
I&C architectures and five different and ad hoc certification
processes, specific to each country.
Conforming to different regulations. Comparing
each IEC standard (and their interpretations) with its ap-
proximately relevant IEEE corresponding standard is diffi-
cult, time consuming and does not ensure to have the correct
interpretation of the different standards. Though the do-
main owns a very precise and established vocabulary, ambi-
guities [16] and interpretations are legions. Legal documents
and standards contain intended and unintended ambiguity
[2, 12], causing interpretations, misunderstandings and ne-
gotiations between stakeholders. Scope of regulations may
also differ as there is no direct mapping from one standard
to another but many overlaps and differences.
Though the task is very difficult, formalizing the require-
ments variability and finding the common core that will en-
able the next I&C architecture generation is more than nec-
essary from the industrial perspective. In the context of the
CONNEXION Project, a product line approach consists to
define a generic foundation that is refined for a given project
by taking into account the specific requirements. This is an
important challenge for building I&C systems on EPR units
or other types of reactors in several countries in order to
avoid the questioning of the initial design principles.
2More details are provided in the following and in a previous
work [18]
3. RESEARCH BACKGROUND
The Common Variability Language (CVL) [5] is a domain-
independent language for specifying and resolving variabil-
ity. We present here the three pillars of CVL and introduce
some terminology that will be used in our approach.
Variability Abstraction Model (VAM ) expresses the
variability in terms of a tree-based structure. Inspired by
feature and decision modeling approaches [6], the main con-
cepts of the VAM are the variability specifications, called
VSpecs. CVL distinguishes three types of VSpecs, essen-
tially linked to their types: choice (Boolean), variable (other
primitive types) and classifier (multiple instanciations).
Base Models (BMs) is a set of models, each conform-
ing to a domain-specific modeling language (DSML). The
conformance of a model to a modeling language depends
both on well-formedness rules (syntactic rules) and busi-
ness, domain-specific rules (semantic rules). The Object
Constraint Language (OCL) is typically used for specifying
the static semantics. In CVL, a base model plays the role
of an asset in the classical sense of SPL engineering. These
models are then customized to derive a complete product.
Variability Realization Model (VRM ) contains a set
of Variation Points (VP). They specify how VSpecs (i.e.,
Choices) are realized in the base model(s). An SPL designer
defines in the VRM what elements of the base models are
removed, added, substituted, modified (or a combination of
these operations) given a selection or a deselection of a choice
in the VAM.
4. OVERVIEW OF THE APPROACH
Figure 1: A two-stages approach (overview)
Fig. 1 depicts the approach we developed to tackle the
variability issues. The long term goal is to configure a ro-
bust I&C architecture from features related to regulatory
requirements. The gap between textual regulatory require-
ments and the architecture is obviously important and vari-
ability cross-cuts both parts. Therefore the key idea is to
exploit architectural design rules as an intermediate between
the regulatory requirements and the architecture.
Intensive interactions between all the involving partners
and numerous workshops and meetings lead to the adoption
of the approach (see also Section 7.3 for more details). Two
separate areas of variabilities are part of the approach (1)
variability among requirements (the main focus of the paper)
led by Inria and (2) variability among the architecture led
by another partner.
Regarding the requirements variability, it can take place at
two levels: the variability of one particular requirement and
the variability of a set of requirements within a product line.
A first key task is to determine the variabilities within the
set of requirements we want to satisfy. At the same time, the
other key task is related to the adaptation of these variable
elements by orchestrating the possible configurations from
the architecture perspective.
The first stage aims at handling the multiple interpre-
tations of ambiguous regulations using mining techniques.
The second stage addresses the impact of requirements vari-
ability on the architecture and its certification through the
variability in design rules. In Section 5, we address more
precisely the mining and modeling of variability in nuclear
standards. In Section 6, we describe how we model variabil-
ity of design rules and the brige between variability in both
requirements and architecture.
5. HANDLING VARIABILITY IN REGULA-
TORY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we present how we manage variability with
nuclear regulatory requirements and its modeling with the
OMG Common Variability Language (CVL) [5]. This do-
main is complex because of the variety of documents one has
to handle; the number of requirements they contain; their
high level of abstraction and ambiguity, etc. We proposed to
analyze variability in regulatory documents with the smaller
scope of topics (A topic is a concern within a corpus (e.g.,
”independence”, ”safety Classification”, etc.)), on different
corpora and on the same abstraction level: regulatory text,
regulatory guidance or standards (see Section 5.3).
Our industrial partners proposed to model variability in
IEC and IEEE standards for each of these two topics: inde-
pendence (see Table 1) and safety classification (see Table 2).
I&C Architecture Concepts. In order to ease the
understanding of the following sections, we briefly describe
the main concepts of a classic I&C architecture. An I&C
architecture can be decomposed into systems that perform
functions. Systems and functions are classified with respect
to their safety importance. These systems and functions are
organized within lines of defense (LDs) and many constraints
drive the organization of the architecture in order to prevent
common cause failures. These constraints mainly deal with
communication or independence (physical separation and/or
electrical isolation) between lines of defense or systems with
respect to their safety classification.
5.1 Requirements Similarity Identification
The first step of Fig. 1 is based on the intuition that fea-
tures are made of clusters of related requirements. In order
to form these clusters, requirements are considered related
if they concern similar matters. Thus, the subject matter
of the requirements has to be compared, and requirements
with similar subject matter will be grouped. For example, in
Table 1, the following safety requirements IEC 60709.1, IEC
60709.11, IEC 60709.12, IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 are
similar because all of them are addressing the independence
between systems. In particular, IEC 60709.1, IEC 60709.11
and IEC 60709.12 are dealing with preventing system degra-
dation, while IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 specify how this
must be achieved.
5.2 Feature clustering
The feature clustering step creates a feature tree based
on the similarity measures from the previous stage. Re-
quirements which are semantically similar, i.e., have the
most in common, are ”clustered” to form a feature. These
smaller features are then clustered with other features and
requirements to form a parent feature. To return to our pre-
vious examples of Section 5.1, in standards, IEC 60709.1,
IEC 60709.11, IEC 60709.12, IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5
are clustered to form Independence between Systems. IEC
60709.1, IEC 60709.11 and IEC 60709.12 are clustered to
create Prevent System Degradation feature, while IEEE 384.1
and IEEE 384.5 are clustered to give Electrical Isolation fea-
ture. Table 3 reports the global traceability between identi-
fied features and standards requirements.
5.3 Modeling Regulatory Requirements Vari-
ability with CVL
We propose to illustrate the complexity of safety require-
ments corpus through the manual search of similar require-
ments dealing with similar matter. As a reminder, this re-
quirements analysis will be made on three different corpora,
France, UK and US and on two standards: IEC and IEEE
for each of these two topics: independence (see Table 1) and
safety classification (see Table 2).
Fig. 2 shows an extract from the requirements model and
its related variability model. Standards and regulatory texts
concerns can be organized as variably concepts and prop-
erties like ICFunction, Independence between Systems (see
Fig. 2), Independence between Functions and Communica-
tion Separation (see Fig. 3) which correspond to mandatory
features.
In Fig. 2, ICSystem and ICFunction are two classifiers
having an instance multiplicity [1..*] (i.e., at least one in-
stance of ICSystem and ICFunction must be created). Each
ICSystem is associated with a Safety Class (See IEC 60964.11
in Table 2) and each ICFunction is associated with a Safety
Category. Each ICFunction is allocated to at least one IC-
System while Safety Category must be lower or equal to
Safety Class. See the OCL constraint attached to ICFunc-
tion and IEC 61513.3 in Table 2.
There are two alternatives for Safety Class: IEC Class
and IEEE Class form an Xor-group (i.e., at least and at most
one feature must be selected). Similarly, IEC Category and
IEEE Category form two alternatives of Safety Category. In-
dependence between Redundant Parts, Independence between
Systems of Different Classes and Prevent System Degrada-
tion are mandatory child features of Independence.Sys. On
the other hand, in Fig. 3, Independence between Functions
of Different Categories is a mandatory child feature of Inde-
pendence between Functions (See IEC 61226.18 in Table 2).
In a previous work, Sannier and Baudry [19] proposed a
formalization of nuclear regulatory requirements into a re-
quirements model using Domain specific languages (DSLs).
We rely on this DSL in our work. Yet, it is worth noticing
that instead of representing only requirements within a lin-
ear organization, they represent a corpus of different kinds
of documents, which contains different kinds of fragments
with different semantics.
Fig. 2 depicts an excerpt of a standards BM that contains
the minimal subset to formalize IEC 60709.1 requirement.
From IEC 60709 standard, we present some transformation
elements into text fragments and the traceability to require-
ments that are created and will be the analyzed elements.
Moreover, this figure illustrates bindings between standards
BM and the standards VAM. For instance, the ”object ex-
istence” variation points against the IEC 60709.1 Section
refer to the choice Independence.Sys, IEC Class and IEC
Category meaning it will exist only when these choices are
decided positively. The ”object existence” variation point
against the IEC 60709.1.b Standard Requirement is bound
to the choice Independence between Systems of Different
Classes.
6. MAPPING BETWEEN REQUIREMENTS
AND ARCHITECTURE
6.1 Modeling Variability in Design Rules
Design Rules to Bridge Requirements and Architecture
Elements.
Modeling requirements variability is useful, however there
is no direct mapping from requirements to the architecture.
To brige the gap between textual regulatory requirements
and the architecture, we move towards variability in design
rules. Design rules, edited by EDF and endorsed by the
French safety authority, are intermediate elements to bridge
the gap between an architecture and the regulatory or nor-
mative requirements. Our industrial partners rely on these
rules to validate the architecture against regulations. A de-
sign rule can satisfy fully or partially one or more require-
ments: in Table 1 SA10 (resp. SA54) completely satisfies
IEC 60709.1 and IEC 60709.11 (resp. IEEE 384.1 and IEEE
384.5).
Identifying and Modeling Variability in Design Rules.
Similarly to requirements, the identification of features in
deign rules consists in comparing the subject matter of rules
followed by a clustering step. For instance, SA10, SA12 and
SA54 are similar because they are dealing with the sepa-
ration of systems of different classes. In particular, SA10
and SA12 deal with communication without perturbation
between systems of different classes whereas SA54 forbids
the communication between them (see Table 1). Table 3 re-
ports the traceability between identified features and design
rules.
Comparing design rules interpretations in the three coun-
tries leads to the variability specification in Fig. 4. The
concept of design rules are decomposed into the following
mandatory features: ICFunction, Communication Separa-
tion in Fig. 3 and the two kinds of communication: Func-
tions Communication (communication between functions)
and Systems Communication (Communication between Sys-
tems). Similarly in standards VAM, each ICFunction is allo-
cated to at least one ICSystem and only one Line of Defense.
France and UK allow the communication between systems
of different classes only if it will not cause systems perturba-
tion using isolation devices (see SA10 and SA12 in Table 1),
however USA forbids it (see SA54 in Table 1). In Fig. 4,
Communication without Perturbation and No Communica-
tion between Systems of Different Classes are two alterna-
tives for Separation between Systems of Different Classes.
Moreover, decouplingType is an optional classifier of Systems
Communication. The latter has an OCL constraint written
in its context comparing the Sender Class and the Receiver
Class. If a Sender Class is lower than its Receiver Class, it
requires isolation: the function non Empty() is used to state
that there is at least one instance of the decouplingType clas-
sifier.
Figure 2: Mapping between standards BM and standards VAM
Table 1: Mining variability in Independence topic
Information sample from IEC and IEEE standard Design Rules
Countries
Index Verbatim Index Rule
IEC 60709.1 Systems performing category A functions shall be protected from con-
sequential physical effects caused by faults and normal actions within
a) redundant parts of those systems, and b) systems of a lower category.
SA10
A lower classified system can not send
information to a higher classified system
or at least it should not disturb any of
these features.
France
and UK
IEC 60709.11 Failures and mal-operations in the non-category A systems shall cause
no change in response, drift, accuracy, sensitivity to noise, or other
characteristics of the category A system which might impair the ability
of the system to perform its safety functions.
IEC 60709.12 Where signals are extracted from category B or C systems for use in
lower category systems, isolation devices may not be required; however,
good engineering practices should be followed to prevent the propaga-
tion of faults.
SA12 A higher classified system can not directly
send information to a lower classified sys-
tem.
France
and UK
IEEE 384.1 Physical separation and electrical isolation shall be provided to main-
tain the independence of Class 1E circuits and equipment so that the
safety functions required during and following any design basis event
can be accomplished.
SA54
No communication between systems with
different classes.
US
IEEE 384.5 1) Non-Class 1E circuits shall be physically separated from Class 1E cir-
cuits and associated circuits by the minimum separation requirements
specified in 6.1.3, 6.1.4, . . . 2) Non-Class 1E circuits shall be electrically
isolated from Class 1E circuits and associated circuits by the use of iso-
lation devices, shielding, and wiring techniques or separation distance.
Table 2: Mining variability in Safety Classification topic
Information sample from IEC and IEEE standard Design Rules
Countries
Index Verbatim Index Rule
IEC 60964.11 The design basis for information systems, including their measurement
devices, shall take into account their importance to safety. The in-
tended safety function of each system and its importance in enabling
the operators to take proper pertinent actions . . .
SA5 Every system and sensor is associated with
safety class.
US,
France
and UK
IEC 61513 .3 d) Each IC system shall be classified according to its suitability to
implement IC functions up to a defined category.
SA8 Function with safety category n can be al-
located only on systems of safety classes n
or >n.
US,
France
and UK
IEC 61226.18 There shall be adequate separation between the functions of different
categories.
FA11 A lower classified function can not send in-
formation to a higher classified function.
US,
France
and UK
IEC 61226.3a An IC function shall be assigned to category C if it meets any of the
following criteria and is not otherwise assigned to category A or cate-
gory B: a) plant process control functions operating so that the main
process variables are maintained within the limits assumed in the safety
analysis not covered by 5.4.3 e).
SA57
SA58
The FA6 function associated category B.
The FA5 function associated category A.
France
Table 3: Identification of features from IEC and IEEE standards and design rules
Features IEC
60709.1
IEC
60709.11
IEC
60709.12
IEEE
384.1
IEEE
384.5
IEC
60964.11
IEC
61513.3
IEC
61226.18
IEC
61226.3a
ICSystem 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
ICFunction 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Safety Classes 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IEC Classes 3 3 3
IEEE Classes 3 3
Safety
Categories
3 3 3 3 3 3 3
IEC Categories 3 3 3 3
IEEE
Categories
Independence.
Sys.
3 3 3 3 3
Independence.
Sys.Diff.Classes
3 3 3 3 3
Independence.
Redundant.
Parts
3
Independence.
Func.
Diff.Categories
3
Prevent System
Degradation
3 3 3
Prevent
Physical Effects
3
Prevent
Failure Effects
3 3
Communication
Separation
3 3 3 3 3 3
Physical
Separation
3 3
Electrical
Isolation
3 3
Features SA5 SA8 SA10 SA12 SA54 FA11 FA13
Safety
Classes
3 3 3 3 3
Sender Class 3 3 3
Receiver Class 3 3 3
Safety
Categories
3
Sender Category 3
Receiver Category 3
Sender LD 3
Receiver LD 3
Separation.Sys.
Diff.Classes
3 3 3
Separation.Func.
Diff.Categories
3
Separation
.Func.Diff.LD
3
Communication.
Without. Pertur-
bation
3 3
No.Communication.
Sys.Diff.Classes
3
The three countries forbid the communication from lower
to higher classified functions (see FA11 in Table 2). An
OCL constraint is attached to Functions Communication,
requiring that the Sender Category must be higher or equal
than Receiver Category. Furthermore, a function allocated
to a line of defense shall not communicate with a function
allocated to another line of defense. Consequently, a second
OCL constraint, attached to Functions Communication is
added.
6.2 Mapping Between the Standards VAM and
the Design Rules VAM
Since design rules represent intermediate elements between
the requirements and the architecture, the design rules VAM
acts like a pivot between the standards VAM and the ar-
chitecture variability model (VM). Fig. 3 depicts two ex-
tracts from both standards VAM and design rules VAM;
and also the mapping between them. For instance, Sepa-
ration between Systems of Different Classes in design rules
VAM is related to Independence between Systems of Differ-
ent Classes in standards VAM. This mapping is due to the
fact that SA10 satisfies IEC 60709.1 and IEC 60709.11 and
SA54 satifies IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5, at the same time,
SA10 and SA54 are related to Separation between Systems
of Different Classes (see Table 3 right-hand side) while IEC
60709.1, IEC 60709.11, IEEE 384.1 and IEEE 384.5 refer
to Independence between Systems of Different Classes (see
Table 3 left-hand side).
Figure 3: Mapping between the standards VAM and the
design rules VAM
6.3 Mapping between the design rules VAM
and the I&C architecture
An architecture metamodel is defined by one partner: the
CEA, based on the different elements that characterize an
I&C system of a nuclear power plant through a SysML pro-
file. CEA uses the SysML modeler Papyrus with the Se-
quoia add-on for managing I&C architecture product line
(see Fig. 4c). As mentioned earlier, industrial partners rely
on design rules to validate the architecture against regula-
tions. However, they do it for each derived architecture.
Thus, we propose to consider both of the design rules VAM
and the architecture VM during the derivation of a particu-
lar architecture.
Fig. 4 illustrates, first the binding between the architec-
ture product line model and the corresponding feature model
and then, the impact of the design rules VAM on the de-
rived architecture. For instance, if we select Communica-
tion Without Perturbation in Fig. 4b, then we allow the
communication between systems of different safety classes.
Yet, the communication from a lower classified system to
a higher classified system requires isolation: decouplingType
(see OCL constraint). As shown in this figure, System com-
munication architecture block in the derived architecture
contains the following links: 1. from higher to lower classi-
fied system :from SICS (Class 1) to DSS (Class 2). 2. from
lower to higher classified system: from PICS (Class 3) to
RCSL (Class 2) by isolation means. 3. between equal clas-
sified systems: from PS A (Class 1) to SICS.
Considering the two OCL constraints in Fig. 4a left-hand
side, we forbid the communication between functions of dif-
ferent lines of defense or from lower to higher classified func-
tion. As a result, Functional communication architecture
block in the derived architecture contains a link from Mon-
itoring LCO(Category: C NCAQ and Line of Defense: L1)
to Elaboration signal control C2 (Category: NC and Line of
Defense: L1).
7. APPLICATION OF THE APPROACH
7.1 Implementation
As mentioned earlier, we use CVL language and tool sup-
port for modeling variability in requirements and design
rules, while CEA address modeling variability in the archi-
tecture using Sequoia tool. The goal of the Sequoia ap-
proach [8], developed by the CEA LIST is to help designers
to build product lines based on UML/SysML models. Vari-
ability in Sequoia is defined through a UML profile [21].
To specify an optional element, the designer simply adds
the stereotype VariableElement to the item. The stereotype
ElementGroup introduces additional information through its
properties, such as constraints between variable elements. In
Sequoia, the decision model is used as a guide enabling to an-
alyze all available variants and paths leading to a completely
defined product. Once the derivation activity is launched,
the choices described by the decision model are proposed to
the user as a series of questions. The output of this process
is a completely defined product and the user is not able to
make any kind of modification to the initial model until the
derivation step is over.
7.2 Use Cases
Data Common Elements
Variable Elements
France UK US
# Requirements 21 13 15 9
# Design rules 3 4 4 4
# Functions 11 2 2 5
# Functions Communications 9 2 2 4
# Systems 19 0 0 1
# Systems Communications 33 15 15 27
Table 4: Use Cases Data Description
(a) Mapping of Design Rules VAM with Functions Communication and Functions Decomposition
(b) Mapping Design Rules VAM with Systems Communication
(c) I&C Architecture PL (Sequoia)
Figure 4: Mapping between Design Rules VAM and I&C Architecture
Table 4 summarizes the input data in the illustrative ex-
ample provided by the industrial partners to implement our
proposed method. The use case contains one generic project
which includes all common element in the product line and
three other projects containing the variable elements, spe-
cific for these three countries (products): France, UK and
USA. In particular, it describes the following information
for each country: 1. Safety Requirements: excerpts from
national regulations and international standards. 2. Design
rules with their corresponding OCL constraints implemented
in the architecture 3. I&C Functions with with their various
properties (safety category, line of defense, number of redun-
dancies, etc). 4. Functions communications: describes the
different communications between functions (unidirectional
and bidirectional) 5. I&C Systems and their different char-
acteristics (safety class, I&C level, line of defense, number of
redundancies) 6. Systems communications: a derivation of
functional communications on the system architecture. To
complete the use case, our industry partners provided us an
association matrix that maps requirements and design rules.
Metric Requirements VAM Design Rules VAM
#Features 64 46
# OCL Constraints 5 5
Table 5: Variability Models Properties
Table 5 describes the main properties of the obtained vari-
ability models specific for our use case. Most of the features
in both VAMs are mandatory. In fact, the challenge of our
partners is not a customization of products, but, to maxi-
mize the common core to gain in terms of money and time
during I&C systems certification.
7.3 Lessons Learned and Discussion
How to introduce variability modeling to nuclear
engineers? In the group, Inria and All4Tec are consid-
ered as variability experts. Though the concepts of similar-
ities and variabilities were roughly understood by our part-
ners, we first had to introduce them to variability and, more
specifically variability modeling. The aim of this introduc-
tion is to lay the foundation of the concepts but also identify
the boundaries of the discipline. We set up several half to
full-day workshops to allow our industry partners to localize
where there will be valuable variability to model, and elicit
what they expect from the variability modeling. From these
inputs, we had been able to propose a dedicated variability
training performed by one of the author, to build the bridge
between initial industrial assumptions and current product
line engineering practices.
What is the best variability modeling paradigm
accordingly to the domain practices? We presented
several different modeling paradigms, analysis capabilities,
current limitations, etc. We discussed the choice of the mod-
eling paradigm and the format of data that we will have to
handle. Interestingly, CVL avoids the feature model (FM)
terminology, while retaining FODA-like concrete syntax of
FM. Since CVL is domain independent, it supports a broad
range of types, including multiple instances, and a constraint
language for expressing dependencies over these types. This
terminology avoids the confusion caused by the ambiguous
meaning of the term feature. Moreover, mapping to artifacts
is a core objective of CVL and CVL stores the variability
outside the base model, which allows the construction of an
explicit common core for regulations.
How to deal with the search space in regulatory
corpora and what is the right granularity level for
modeling requirements variability? As mentioned
earlier, nuclear domain is complex because of the variety of
documents one has to handle, the number of requirements
they contain, their high level of abstraction and ambiguity,
etc. Following a naive method leads to variability models
with fine granularity, verbose, and as a result, hard to un-
derstand and maintain by our industrial partners. To narrow
this problem space, the first idea was to analyze variability
in regulatory documents by topic on different corpora and
on the same abstraction level. Thus, our industrial part-
ners proposed to apply this approach on two standards and
for different topics. Furthermore, using traceability matrix
improves the understandability and the maintainability of
variability models.
How to address the requirements variability on
the architecture? Modeling requirements variability is
useful, however there is no direct mapping from require-
ments to the architecture. Therefore, we propose heading
toward modeling variability in design rules since they act
as a pivot between requirements and the architecture. The
industrial partners rely on these rules to validate the archi-
tecture against safety requirements because they claim to
satisfy one or several requirements. This idea allowed us to
investigate the robustness of the architecture against regula-
tory requirements variability not considered by the product
line and identify its impact on the architecture. Therefore,
our industrial partners proposed a use case to implement
our CVL approach for modeling variability in requirements
and design rules and mapping them to the architecture.
8. RELATED WORK
Requirements and Variability Modeling. Goal-
oriented approaches like Tropos [3], i* [24], KAOS [22] or
URN [10] have been used to address legal and regulatory re-
quirements and their mapping to the system elements. How-
ever, though goal models explicitely describes influences on
requirements, they lack of a concrete variability understand-
ing. As stated by Siena et al. [20], goals applied to laws and
regulations are useful when the complexity of the statements
is little enough to be reduced to goal relations.
Mining Variability. Alves et al. [1], Niu et al. [15],
Weston et al. [23] and Chen et al. [4] applied information
retrieval techniques to abstract requirements from existing
specifications, typically expressed in natural language. Fer-
rari et al. [9] applied natural language processing techniques
to mine commonalities and variabilities from brochures. Our
industrial context exhibits characteristics that makes the
problem of mining variability difficult. Topic overlaps, ab-
sence of an ontology, intrinsic heterogeneity and ambiguity.
Consequently, we have introduced lightweight manual tech-
niques to gradually support participants. The question to
determine whether automated techniques can provide a re-
liable support to the consortium is still open.
Analysing (Regulatory) Requirements Variabilities.
Siena et al. proposed to address variability of law with No´-
mos 2 [20]. The proposed metamodel mainly aims to under-
stand influences or margins within selected ”norms” (text
fragments from laws). Zhang et al. [25] propose ”special-
ization, characterization, decomposition” links for their re-
quirements refinements; ”require, mutex, excludes” links for
the constraints, as well as influence and interaction depen-
dencies. Maxwell et al. [14] propose a taxonomy of cross-
references dedicated to the identification of conflicts between
requirements. In both cases, the analysis remains manual
and focused on selective and already defined sets of elements.
One possible solution toward multiple jurisdictions can be
to have the most constrained system possible. To this end,
Gordon and Breaux [11] have developed a watermarking ap-
proach in order to determine the most constrained state-
ment. Our goal is rather to capture all possible variations
and keep flexibility.
9. CONCLUSION
With the renewal of the nuclear industry, the French nu-
clear energy industrials are aimed to sell and develop prod-
ucts outside France. A major challenge is the conformance
of products to multiple different and heterogeneous regula-
tions, which introduce a necessary product line perspective.
In this paper, we proposed an approach to model vari-
ability in safety requirements and I&C architectural design.
Our approach provides a variability-aware bridging of these
two levels of abstraction in order to derive a complying ar-
chitecture. We instantiated our approach on a realistic use
case. Participants of the nuclear consortium can now map
the variability of regulatory requirements onto architecture
elements. We provided some lessons learned about the in-
troduction of variability into this particular domain.
We are currently improving the different variability mod-
eling tools, based on the Common Variability Language, of
both parts – requirements and architecture – of the project.
As future work, we aim to investigate the use of automated
techniques to mine variability in regulatory requirements.
We also plan to further exploit traceability links in order to
reason about the conformance between regulatory require-
ments and the architecture of the CONNEXION project.
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